What to make of a surprise shake-up in China’s nuclear force

THE LAST time that China’s supreme leader, Xi Jinping, purged the top tiers of the military elite, he could blame their venality on his predecessors. His two most senior scalps, Generals Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong, were both accused of taking massive bribes in exchange for promotions. But not on Mr Xi’s watch. The generals had joined the Communist Party’s Central Military Commission, which oversees the armed forces, in 1999 and retired as its vice chairmen in 2012, the year that Mr Xi took power.

The downfall of General Li Yuchao, the commander of China’s Rocket Force, and its political commissar, General Xu Zhongbo, touches Mr Xi more directly. He put them in charge of China’s land-based nuclear and conventional missiles. No reason was given when official media announced on July 31st that they had been replaced. Nor was there any indication of their fate, although there is speculation that General Li and other Rocket Force officials could be under investigation for corruption or leaking military secrets.

Whatever the trigger, their premature removal confirms the biggest clean-out of the military top brass in almost a decade. That suggests that Mr Xi’s efforts to reform the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) are facing more obstacles than previously thought. It is also the latest example of his own appointees running into trouble, in what some see as a sign of his own misjudgment, and of divisions within the elite. Last month saw the equally sudden removal as foreign minister of Qin Gang, who was given that post by Mr Xi in December.

Mr Xi’s supporters might argue that he is injecting new momentum into two of his signature domestic initiatives—an anti-corruption drive and a programme to transform the PLA into a modern fighting force. They might also make the case that he is demonstrating a commendable resistance to favouritism by not shielding protégés. Still, the suddenness and scale of the upheaval, the lack of any clear explanation and the persistent rumours of further scandal all reflect badly on his leadership, and suggest an unusual degree of turmoil in the corridors of power.

The changes at the Rocket Force surprised many experts on the PLA because the service has been a priority for Mr Xi in recent years. “If there is one service that you want to be utterly incorruptible, it would be the one in control of nuclear missiles,” says Timothy Heath of the RAND Corporation, an American think-tank. “Clearly, there’s something going on that has made Xi Jinping uneasy about his fellow elites.”

Formerly known as the PLA Second Artillery Corps, the Rocket Force was renamed and upgraded in 2015. It became a separate service with equivalent status to the army, navy and air force, a reflection of its growing importance to Mr Xi’s military ambitions. Another signal came in 2018, when its former commander, General Wei Fenghe, was promoted to defence minister. He was the only person without an army background to have held that post.

The Rocket Force now oversees the world’s biggest arsenal of land-based missiles. Among them are hundreds of conventional cruise and ballistic missiles, many of which are designed to target American ships in a potential war over Taiwan. They also include most of China’s estimated 300 intercontinental ballistic missiles and 400 nuclear warheads, according to the Pentagon’s latest annual report on China’s armed forces.

The Rocket Force’s share of China’s military budget is thought to have been rapidly expanding, too. In recent years it has been at the centre of an upgrade of China’s nuclear arsenal that is unprecedented in its scale and complexity, according to the Pentagon. It predicts that China could have as many as 1,500 warheads by 2035—the deadline Mr Xi has set for the PLA’s “basic modernisation”.

Although there is as yet no public indication that funds from this programme have been misused, big military-spending schemes have often enabled embezzlement, kickbacks and other types of graft. The background of the Rocket Force’s new commander, General Wang Houbin, and its new political commissar, General Xu Xisheng, also suggests that Mr Xi is bringing in outsiders to disrupt patronage networks in the service. General Wang has spent his entire career so far in the navy, while General Xu has previously worked only in the air force.

“To drop both the commander and the political commissar at the same time may be a first. And then to replace them with outsiders is really very telling,” says Brendan Mulvaney of the China Aerospace Studies Institute, a US Air Force think-tank. “There is probably some deep rot at the top of the Rocket Force, but I have no idea if it’s money, women, secrets or some combination.”

Mr Mulvaney notes that General Xu, who as political commissar is responsible for enforcing ideology and party discipline, is a full member of the party’s central committee. He thus has higher political status than General Wang, who is not a member of the body. That underlines the message that the party retains ultimate authority over the PLA, which is technically its armed wing rather than a national force, as in most other countries.

There are indications that the Rocket Force’s troubles extend to other current and former officers as well. At least one former deputy commander is under investigation and another took his own life in early July, according to recent reports, albeit unconfirmed. There is even speculation that the problems may implicate General Wei, the former Rocket Force commander who stepped down as defence minister in March.

The upheaval may also be linked to recent changes in the operations of the Rocket Force, which is now frequently put on alert, requiring its troops to be ready to mount warheads on missiles, says Phillip Saunders of America’s National Defense University. Those and other recent changes suggest that China is moving away from its longstanding “no first use” policy—to launch atomic weapons only after sustaining a nuclear attack—towards one of “launch on warning”, whereby it would fire them as soon as it detected incoming nuclear missiles.

“That puts a big premium on the political loyalty and reliability of the Rocket Force commanders out in the field. And if the force is corrupt, and people are paying for promotions, that’s a breakdown of political responsibility right there,” says Mr Saunders. If military secrets have indeed been leaked, he adds, “it might mean that there’s people who can’t be trusted within the nuclear chain of command. That would be a very serious issue.” ■

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